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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-1251 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL W. ZUBASIC;  
DAWN M. ZUBASIC, 
   Appellants 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
(Tax Ct. No. 14-018640) 
Tax Court Judge:  Honorable Robert P. Ruwe 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2016 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, KRAUSE and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Michael and Dawn Zubasic appeal from the Tax Court’s order granting the 
Commissioner’s motion to dismiss their petition for failure to prosecute.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the Tax Court’s order. 
 The Zubasics, who own a company called Basic Building Interiors, LLC, took a 
deduction of $138,276 for depreciable business assets, and filed an income tax return 
showing no tax liability for 2011.  Thereafter, the Internal Revenue Service issued a 
notice of deficiency, disallowing the business asset deduction and determining that the 
Zubasics owed additional income tax and an accuracy-related penalty.  The Zubasics 
challenged the notice of deficiency by filing a petition in the Tax Court.    
 On April 9, 2015, the IRS informed the Zubasics that the Tax Court had scheduled 
a trial session for November 2, 2015, asked the Zubasics for certain information and 
documents, and urged the Zubasics to participate in the preparation of a Stipulation of 
Facts.  Several months later, the Tax Court officially informed the parties that the case 
was set for trial on November 2, 2015.  The Tax Court notice also set dates by which the 
parties were to exchange any documents expected to be offered at trial, to file pretrial 
memoranda, and to submit a joint stipulation of facts.  Notably, the notice emphasized 
that failure to comply with those requirements might result in dismissal of the case.  The 
Tax Court sent an additional notice to the parties on September 18, 2015, reminding them 
to be present for trial and that failure to appear may result in dismissal of the petition.  
The IRS wrote to the Zubasics on October 13, 2015, advising that the requested 
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documents had not been provided, suggesting a conference to discuss a possible 
settlement, and noting the scheduled trial date.   
 The Tax Court called the case for trial as scheduled, but the Zubasics failed to 
appear.  The IRS filed a motion to dismiss based on the Zubasics’ failure to prosecute the 
case.  The Tax Court granted that motion on November 12, 2015, holding that the 
Zubasics were liable for a tax deficiency and an accuracy-related penalty.  The Zubasics 
appealed.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1), and review the Tax 
Court’s decision to dismiss the Zubasics’ petition for failure to prosecute under an abuse 
of discretion standard.  Sauers v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 64, 66 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. 
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)).  
 As noted by the Commissioner, the Zubasics offer no justification for their failure 
to appear for the trial, and they do not specifically challenge the Tax Court’s decision to 
dismiss the petition for failure to prosecute.  Accordingly, any argument with respect to 
the Tax Court’s dismissal has been waived.  See  United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an 
issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  Nevertheless, we 
conclude that the Tax Court acted within its discretion in dismissing the Zubasics’ 
petition for failure to prosecute.   
 The Tax Court may “dismiss a case at any time and enter a decision against the 
petitioner” if the petitioner fails to prosecute his or her case, to comply with the rules of 
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practice and procedure, or for any other cause the Tax Court deems sufficient.  See 26 
U.S.C. § 7453; Tax Court Rule 123(b).  In particular, a case “may be dismissed for 
failure properly to prosecute” if there is an “unexcused absence of a party . . . when a 
case is called for trial.”  Tax Court Rule 149(a).  Here, the Zubasics were notified several 
times about their pretrial obligations and the trial date.  But they failed to cooperate with 
the Commissioner, failed to submit a pretrial memorandum, and failed to appear for trial.   
 On appeal, the Zubasics appear to argue that they were not required to substantiate 
the depreciation deduction because their tax return included Form 5213, titled “Election 
to Postpone Determination as To Whether the Presumption Applies Than an Activity Is 
Engaged in for Profit.”  Even if the Zubasics are correct, their argument does not excuse 
their obligation to prosecute their petition.  Indeed, we have stated that “[a] party 
disappointed with a court’s ruling may not refuse to proceed and then expect to obtain 
relief on appeal from an order of dismissal or default.”  Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 
454 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that when a plaintiff willfully refuses to proceed, a court 
need not weigh the six factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 
863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), before dismissing the case for lack of prosecution).    
 Under these circumstances, dismissal of the Zubasics’ petition for failure to 
prosecute was proper.  See, e.g., Sauers, 771 F.2d at 66 (affirming Tax Court’s dismissal 
for failure to prosecute where taxpayer refused in engage in a stipulation of facts and 
indicated that he had no evidence to present at trial).  Therefore, we will affirm the Tax 
Court’s order.    
